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Marriage Consent vis-à-vis St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
notion on Internal Freedom
“Marriage and Family” is the foundation stone of an authentic human 
society. It springs from a Divine Institution and it follows the very nature 
of the human person. “God created humankind in his own image and like-
ness; calling them to existence through love, he called them at the same 
time for love”1. In this line, the Council defines marriage as a “covenant 
of love”2; a covenant which is “freely and consciously chosen, whereby 
a man and a woman accept the intimate community of life and love willed 
by God himself”3. 
Love is essentially a voluntary giving of oneself. In marriage, this act 
of giving is the one contained in the consent of the spouses, which signi-
fies a mutual giving and accepting – of their conjugality – as something 
owed in Justice. 
To understand fully the exact meaning of marriage consent we must allow ourselves 
to be enlightened by divine revelation. The marriage covenant is an act of the will which 
signifies and involves a mutual giving which unites the spouses between themselves and 
at the same time binds them to the children which they may eventually have, with whom 
they constitute one family, one single home, a domestic family4. 
It is this demand, intrinsically contained in every marriage, that con-
sent – in order to be valid – has to be sufficiently free, conscious and true. 
1 John Paul II, Apost. Ex. Familiaris consortio, November 22, 1981, n. 11 in AAS, 74 (1982), p. 91.
2 Vatican Council II, Past. Cons. Gadium et spes, December 7, 1965, n. 48 in AAS, 58 (1966), p. 1067. 
3 John Paul II, Apost. Ex. Familiaris consortio, Op. cit.
4 John Paul II, Address to the Roman Rota, January 28, 1982, n. 4 in AAS, 74 (1982) pp. 450–451.
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So, all other requirements and restrictions follow from this very nature 
of marriage for the benefit of man himself and his society. 
It is then appropriate for us - Blessed John Paul II says - […] to deepen our understanding 
of the meaning of the act of the gift of oneself in a total oblation by means of a consent, 
which, if given in time, has a value for eternity5.
The formation of a free consent in Marriage 
Vatican Council II defines marriage as a covenant of love6 “freely and 
consciously chosen7”, whereby man and woman accept the intimate com-
munity of life and love willed by God himself8. The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, in this line, insists on the freedom for contracting marriage: “The 
parties to a marriage covenant are a baptized man and woman, free to con-
tract marriage, who freely expresses their consent; «to be free» means: – not 
being under constraint; – not impeded by any natural or ecclesiastical law” 
(n. 1625). “The consent consists in a «human act by which the partners 
mutually give themselves to the other»” (n. 1627). “The consent must be an 
act of the will of the contracting parties, free of coercion or grave exter-
nal fear. No human power can substitute for this consent. If this freedom 
is lacking the marriage is invalid” (n. 1628). 
This marriage covenant is brought into being by the true manifesta-
tion of the marriage consent between spouses, which is the meaning of the 
principle: “consensus facit matrimonium9”. This basic principle has been 
expressed in a clear-cut statement by the Angelic Doctor in the following 
words: “Unus non accipit potestatem in eo quod est libere alterius, nisi 
per eius consensum. Sed per matrimonium accipit uterque coniugum 
5 Ibidem, n. 6.
6 Cfr. Vatican Council II, Past. Cons. Gadium et spes, December 7, 1965, n. 48. AAS, 58 (1966), p. 1067. 
7 John Paul II, Address to the Roman Rota, January 28, 1982, in AAS, 74 (1982) pp. 449–454: English 
translation taken from L’Osservatore Romano, February 8, 1982, pp. 6–7.
8 Cfr. John Paul II, Apost. Ex. Familiaris consortio, November 22, 1981, n. 11 in AAS, 74 (1982), p. 91. 
9 Cfr. E. Saldon, El Matrimonio, misterio y signo (siglos I a S. Agustín), Pamplona 1971; T. Rincón-
Pérez, El Matrimonio, misterio y signo (siglos IX a XIII), Pamplona 1971; E. Tejero, El Matrimonio, miste-
rio y signo (siglos XIV a XVI), Pamplona 1971; J. E. Muñoz, El Matrimonio, misterio y signo (siglos XVII 
y XVII), Pamplona 1982. In our consultations, we found in these monographs a nearly exhaustive 
bibliographical information about the orientations of the theological and canonical doctrine 
concerning this argument. 
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potestatem […]. Ergo, consensus facit Matrimonium”10. The medieval 
lengthy debate about what precisely brought marriage into being, i.e. its 
sufficient cause: consent or consummation, saw its settling down through 
Pope Alexander III (1159–1181). The principle matrimonium facit partium 
consensus was thus confirmed definitively while affirming that consum-
mation gives it absolute indissolubility. 
Beneath this affirmation, the concept of internal freedom in matrimo-
nial consent plays a fundamental role, being an essential prerequisite for 
the person’s capacity to contract it. In point of fact, the aforementioned 
principle “is of paramount importance in the whole canonical and theo-
logical teaching received from tradition and has frequently been restated 
by the Church’s Magisterium as one of the chief bases on which both the 
natural law of the institution of marriage and the evangelical precept are 
founded”11. Thus, Pope Paul VI—in what is to be his last allocution to the 
Roman Rota—leaves us this exhortation: 
Therefore, it is the duty of this tribunal, in carrying out the commission given it by the 
Church, to study carefully all the questions submitted to it. Moreover, […] it is its serious 
duty to have special regard […] for questions relative to the formation of a free consent, 
which alone gives rise to marriage12.
Man, the only creature on earth that God willed for itself, will only find 
himself to the greatest degree through a sincere “gift-giving” of himself13. 
In this line Pope John Paul II reminds the members of the Roman Rota: 
Love is essentially a gift. Speaking of the act of love the Council envisages an act of giving, 
which is one, decisive, irrevocable because it is a total giving which wants to be and to re-
main mutual and fruitful […] The marriage consent is an act of the will which signifies 
and involves a mutual giving […] One who gives oneself does it with awareness of obliging 
to live one’s giving of oneself to other. If one grants to the other person a right, it is because 
one wishes to give oneself; and one gives oneself with the intention of obliging oneself 
to carry out what is required by the total giving one has freely made14.
10 Summa Theologiae, Supplementum, q. 45, a. 1.
11 Paul VI, Address to the Roman Rota, February 9, 1976, in AAS, 68 (1976) pp. 204–208; English 
translation from latin in The Pope speaks, 21 (1976–1977) pp. 150–154. Also see Mt 19: 5–6; Denzinger 
nn. 643, 756, 1497, 1813, 3701 and 3713.
12 Paul VI, Address to the Roman Rota, January 28, 1978, in AAS, 70 (1978) pp. 181–186. English 
translation taken from The Pope Speaks, 23 (1978), pp. 158–163. 
13 Cfr. Gaudium et spes, n. 24 in AAS, 58 (1966, pp. 1025–115.
14 John Paul II, Address to the Roman Rota, January 28, 1982 in AAS, 74 (1982) pp. 450–451. 
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Therefore, the juridical formulation: “consensus matrimonialis est actus 
voluntatis”15. It is indeed an internal act of the will, i.e. a voluntary or free 
will act16. Now, every voluntary or free will act is a human act, it is any act 
which comes from the whole person through his voluntary-knowing choice. 
As the then Card. Wojtyla affirms: 
The most significant characteristics of the person’s inner life are the sense of truth and the 
sense of freedom […]. Truth is a condition of freedom […]. His ability to discover the truth 
gives man the possibility of self determination, of deciding for himself the character and 
direction of his own actions, and that is what freedom means17.
Thus, according to natural law if there are some defects regarding the 
effective “voluntariness”18 of the human act which positively renders the 
qualified matrimonial consent void, then it necessarily follows that mar-
riage does not exist at all. Therefore, it is for this reason that the Church 
– ever open to the advances of modern sciences, especially by contem-
porary psychiatry and psychology19 – has always availed of the doctrine 
15 Thus, canon 1057 § 2 of the new Code stands as the juridical formulation of what has always 
been the doctrine of the Church on Marriage. Cfr. AAS, 75 (1983/II), p. 187. 
16 Determining the matrimonial consent as an act of the will, the 1983 Code of Canon Law es-
tablishes the requirements sine qua non for the validity in contracting marriage. Above all it has 
to be a qualified human act based on the sufficient use of reason in relation to the will (c. 1095 § 1); 
a minimal but sufficient knowledge of the essentials of marriage (c. 1096); a sufficient discretionary 
judgement concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and 
accepted (c. 1095 § 2); capable of assuming these essential obligations of marriage (c. 1095 § 3) and 
a consent free from any force or of grave fear imposed from outside (c. 1103); internal voluntary consent 
of the person which is always presumed true except when there is a positive act of the will to exclude 
marriage itself or any of its essential element or property (c. 1101). 
17 K. Wojtyla, Love and Responsability, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 1993, pp. 114–115. Also cfr. 
Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 1.
18 We believe Prof. García de Haro’s observation to be very significant in these introductory 
principles: «Los impedimentos de la voluntariedad son los factores que privan o disminuyen la in-
tegridad de alguno de los elementos esenciales para la libertad del acto. Es decir, la ignorancia, que 
se opone al conocimiento necesario; la violencia, que en diversos grados fuerzan la voluntariedad, 
las pasiones, en la medida en que obnubilan la razón y entre las cuales tiene especial importancia 
el miedo; en fin, los disturbios psíquicos de la inteligencia y de la voluntad, o enfermedades mentales. 
Así lo resume el Catecismo de la Iglesia Católica (no. 1735): “La imputabilidad y la responsabilidad de una 
acción pueden quedar disminuidas, e incluso suprimidas, a causa de la ignorancia, la inadvertencia, 
la violencia, el temor, los hábitos, los afectos desordenados y otros factores psíquicos y sociales”» R. García 
de Haro y E. Cófrecces Merino, Teología Moral Fundamental, Pamplona 1998, pp. 205–206. Also see: 
R. García de Haro, Marriage and Family in the Documents of the Magisterium, Ignatius Press San Francisco 
1993; R. MacInerny, Ethica thomistica. The moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Washington 1982, p. 63.
19 Cfr. John Paul II, February 5, 1987, in AAS, 79 (1987) pp.1453–1459.
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on this discipline of the Angelic Doctor as it undoubtedly offers a very 
coherent anthropological presuppositions with Christian anthropology, 
i.e. the spiritual activity of man and his freedom that proceeds from the 
intellect and the will directed to the highest truth and goodness: willing 
following upon knowing and leading to knowing. We see St. Thomas’ conclu-
sion summarized in the principle ubi intellectus, ibi voluntas applied by the 
Apostolic Tribunal of the Roman Rota in a famous decision coram Wynen: 
“Unde, sicut nequit voluntas in iis quae sunt intellectu praedita. Ubi intel-
lectus, ibi voluntas, et vice versa”20. According to this principle “where there 
is knowledge there is will and vice-versa”, the scholastics held that the 
free choice of the will cannot be lacking unless in the disturbed intellect. 
Today, however, the following distinctions have first to be made. Firstly, 
about the principle: “where there is will there is knowledge”; inasmuch 
as every act of the will needs – by necessity – a minimum knowledge of the 
object. This principle is logically accepted. Secondly, however, many deny 
the principle that there is “where there is knowledge, then there is always 
will”. The motivation behind this objection is the fact that it can also 
happen that persons endowed with normal intellectual capacity lack the 
strength of will to implement realities, which they judge to be good and 
necessary. Here, the issue is not about the very tight bond by which the 
will is attached to the intellect. Rather, the apt use of the will in eliciting 
matrimonial consent is – above all – taken into account because of the fact 
that personal interior disorders are more easily discovered in the realm 
of the will than in the simple apprehension of the intellect. Also, as we will 
discuss it later, the formal act of the will – by which marriage covenant 
is produced21 – is the terminus of the human action from which it receives 
its very proper and irreplaceable firmness22.
St. Thomas and the Internal Freedom in marriage consent.
It should be said from the very start that here we do not pretend 
to present a thorough study of the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas in re-
lation to the canonical doctrine on internal freedom. We shall, however, try 
20 coram Wynen, sent. diei 27 februarii 1937, RRDec., vol. XXIX, pg. 171, n. 4.
21 Cfr. can. 1057 § 2.
22 Cfr. coram Turnaturi, sent. diei 5 martii 1998, Monitor Ecclesiasticus I (1999), p. 73, n. 23.
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to develop a broad outline essential to have a sufficient understanding 
of his concept on this theme. The Angelic Doctor examines in detail in the 
Summa Theologiae and subordinately in his public disputations on evil – the 
Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo –, one of the faculties that easily stands out 
as one of the momentous facts in the whole creation, i.e. the motivating 
power of man’s human actions: his free will. Here is how St. Thomas con-
fronts this question in the Summa Theologiae as eruditely presented in one 
of the works of an expert on the Angelic Doctor: 
In the First Part, the study of the free will followed that of the intellectual faculties (q. 79). 
It was introduced by a preamble on sense knowledge (q. 78), and placed among questions 
on the appetitive powers: the sensible appetite (q. 81) as a preamble, then the will (q. 82), 
and finally free will (q. 83). In this arrangement we can already see clearly the dependence 
of free will in relation to intellect and will. Since faculties are revealed through their actions, 
it was appropriate to extend the study of them with a discussion of the human act, in the 
Prima Secundae. Here we find the same arrangement of topics: first, the acts of the will, 
desire, intention, and fruition; then the acts wherein free will is exercised, particularly 
choice (q. 13). It is the analysis of choice that enables us to establish, as early as the first 
part (q. 83, a 3), the nature of free will23.
In the prologue of the Prima Secundae – where St. Thomas directly treats 
the theme about man and his actions – he writes: 
Man is said to be made in God’s image, in so far as the image implies an intelligent being 
endowed with free-will and self-movement […]. Man, […] is the principle of his actions 
as having free-will and control of his actions24.
Accordingly, in dealing with human freedom – in its two aspects: one 
in relation to God whose work it was25 and the other in relation to man 
with his own work26 – St. Thomas considers thoroughly its existence and 
its object so as to analyze its essential property and the relations between 
the will and the intellect from which freedom proceeds. The Angelic 
Doctor concludes this treatise clarifying the question on whether man’s 
will is moved of necessity or not.
23 S. Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources of Christian Ethics. T&T Clark-Edinburgh, 1995, p. 380. (English 
translation taken from the third edition by Sr. May Thomas Noble, O.P.). Italics are ours.
24 Summa Theologiae, I-II, Prologus.
25 Cfr. Ibidem, I, qq. 79–83.
26 Cfr. Ibidem, Ia IIae, qq. 6–21.
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The Human Will and its Object
St. Thomas affirms that man is the only creature on earth endowed 
by God with a singular intellectual appetency27 called the will. Over and 
above the vegetative and sensitive principles of operations specifically 
proper to plants and animals, man28 is equipped with the spiritual – or psy-
chic – faculties of intellect and will. We know from Aquinas that although 
named from appetite, will in us belongs to the appetitive part which has not 
for its only act the seeking of what it does not posses but, also the loving 
and delighting in what it does posses.29 Commenting on St. Thomas, Card. 
Wojtyla concludes: “Man’s nature differs fundamentally from that of the 
animals. It includes the powers of self determination, based on reflection, 
and manifested in the fact that a man acts from choice. This power is called 
the free will”30. Here is how Aquinas puts it. 
Hence such animals, as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose, 
are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is 
to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate 
them. Hence, a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings; for their power 
of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man 
the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move 
the organs of movement31.
The will as the rational appetency of intellectual beings is a faculty 
distinct from the sentient or sensitive appetency. It is the natural inclina-
tion towards what is sensed as good and the natural aversion from what 
is sensed as evil. The will tends to the end for which it is made, to what 
is intellectually grasped as good and towards the possession of good in gen-
eral. St. Thomas concludes that what is apprehended by the intellect and 
by the senses are generally different, it follows that the intellectual appetite 
27 This is one of the terms commonly used in the Summa Theologiae but, as one expert on Aquinas 
comments «la teoria proviene da Aristotele per designare la tendenza di una cosa verso il rag-
giungimento del proprio fine. L’appetito consiste precisamente nell’inclinazione dell’appetente 
verso un oggetto (appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. [S.Th., Ia IIae, q. 8, a. 1])» 
M. Battista, Dizionario Enciclopedico del Pensiero di San Tommaso d’Aquino, 1991, pp.55–56. 
28 As St. Thomas says, man differs from irrational animals in this that he is the master of his ac-
tions. Therefore those actions alone – of which man is master – are the ones properly called human. 
And, is master of his actions through his reason and will. cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 1, a. 1. 
29 Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 19, a. 1 Reply Obj. 2.
30 K. Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 1993, p. 23–24.
31 Summa Theologiae, I, q. 18. a. 3. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 
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is distinct from the sensitive32. As a consequence, man – by his will informed 
by the intellect – is capable of possessing the forms of all being, i.e. the 
universal good. It is its natural inclination: “As the intellect necessarily 
adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last 
end, which is happiness”33. Thus, everything that good comprehends is also 
contained in the object of the will: 
For since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the aspect of good can 
be the object of an act of the will: and since to will is itself a good, man can will himself 
to will. Even so the intellect, whose object is the true, that it understands, because this 
again is something true34. 
St. Thomas’ three different considerations with respect to freedom of the 
will starts with the fundamental principle that the will is considered free 
inasmuch as it is not tied up to its necessities, that is “voluntas dicatur libera 
in quantum necessitatem non habet”: 
quantum ad primum horum inest libertas voluntati in quolibet statu naturae respectu 
cuiuslibet obiecti; cuiuslibet enim voluntatis actus est in potestate ipsius respectu cuius-
libet obiecti. Secundum vero horum est respectu quorundam obiectorum, scilicet respectu 
eorum quae sunt ad finem et non ipsius finis etiam secundum quemlibet statum naturae. 
Tertium vero non est respectu omnium obiectorum sed quorundam, scilicet eorum quae 
sunt ad finem, nec respectu cuiuslibet status naturae sed illius tantum in quo natura de-
ficere potest: nam ubi non est defectus in apprehendendo et conferendo non potest esse 
voluntas mali etiam in his quae sunt ad finem, sicut patet in beatis. Et pro tanto dicitur quod 
velle malum nec est libertas nec pars libertatis quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum35.
Moreover it is worth noting that today that because of the widespread 
influence of nominalism, the term will has generally taken on an extremely 
voluntaristic sense or something like a command of pure obedience – set-
ting aside the role of the intellect – upon oneself or others. However, for 
St. Thomas the will was primarily the faculty of love and desire – the first 
two acts attributed to it – as can be seen in the treatise on the passions. 
What must come first in such an agent is an attachment to the goal in ques-
tion as being an attractive one, for nothing sets itself an end which it does 
not find in some way attractive or appropriate. Then, it moves toward the 
goal and consequently comes to rest in the goal once it has been attained. 
32 Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 80, a. 2.
33 Ibidem, I, q. 82, a. 1. 
34 Ibidem, IIa IIae, q. 25, a.2. 
35 De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6.
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Thus, the proportion of the appetite in regard to the good is love, which is none 
other than complaisance in the good; the movement towards the good is desire 
or “concupiscence”; the reposal in the good is enjoyment or pleasure. Consequently, 
according to this order love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure36. 
In every voluntary act there exists as a spiritual spontaneity brought 
about by the will’s natural attraction to the good. It is only by following 
this that the will can act upon itself and move to will those ways and means 
leading to the good it loves and desires. This process is affected precisely 
by an act of choice. Albeit one could speak of the will as imposing itself 
only in cases wherein some resistance has to be overcome; this could be in-
terior (e.g. from our sensibility) or exterior (i.e. from others). In every case 
however the spontaneity of love and desire is primary, it moves on the act 
of the will. It is clear, therefore, that the will is not a sheer pressure (as 
it maybe understood predominantly in current usage), rather it gives rise 
to an impression of goodness that causes attraction. Thus, the outcome – of 
this voluntary movement – is the pleasure resulting from the union with 
the good whose fullness is happiness. The will is therefore not domineer-
ing by nature but unitive37. 
The relations between the faculties of the Will and the Intellect38
After having studied the fundamental premises with regard to the will, 
we now come to the analysis of the relations between the two spiritual 
or psychic faculties of man: the will (voluntas) and the intellect (intellectus), 
according to St. Thomas. First of all we should say that the Angelic Doctor 
insisted on their mutual coordinating movement and at the same time their 
generative difference: “cum intellectus sub cognoscitivo comprehendatur, 
voluntas autem sub appetitivo, oportet voluntatem et intellectum esse 
potentias etiam genere diversas”39. 
A human act – “actus humanus” – is a voluntary act constituted by the 
faculties of the will and the intellect40. Now, since the function proper to the 
36 Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 25, a. 2. 
37 Cfr. S. Pinckaers, O.P. Op. cit., p. 389–390.
38 St. Thomas treats the question also in De Malo, qq. 3 and 6; II Sentetiae, dd. 24–25, 35 and 39; and 
De Veritate, q. 22 aside from the parts of the Summa Theologiae that we have already mentioned earlier.
39 De Veritate, q. 22, art., 10, in corp. 
40 Cfr. Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 1.
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will is the freedom to choose it follows that there can never be choice 
if there is no freedom. As the Angelic Doctor says: “proprium liberi arbi-
tri est election”. Thus, we normally say that we have free will by the fact 
that we can take one thing while refusing another (i.e. the act of choosing): 
“The proper of act of free will is choice […]. Therefore we must consider 
the nature of free will, by considering the nature of choice”41. The will, 
however, always presupposes a prius, which is the intellect so much so that 
their reciprocal contribution gives light to the two principles: first, that 
“ubi intellectus ibi voluntas”. Msgr. Wynen transformed this Thomistic 
principle the central argument of one of his then famous sentences: 
Pariter non existunt morbi, quibus voluntas eaque sola directe afficitur, ita tu liberum 
arbitrium tollatur […]. Unde, sicut nequit esse voluntas in iis quae intellectu carent, 
ita, e contra, certe adest in iis quae sunt intellectu praedita. Ubi intellectus, ibi voluntas, 
et viceversa […]. Ii Auctores moderni, qui statuun ipsam voluntatem alicuius hominis ple-
no usu rationis gaudentis laborare posse certis morbis, non sunt imbuti sanis principiis 
philosophicis neque cognoscunt naturam actus cognitionis et voluntatis, ideoque facile 
in errores perducuntur42.
And second, that “nihil volitum quin praecognitum”. At this point 
a commentary of an expert could be of help to clarify this theme.
Il fulcro della fondazione della psicologia propria alla filosofia tomistica è l’idea che gli atti 
volontari siano atti appartenenti in parte all’intelletto e in parte alla volontà, ciascuno dei 
quali agisce e subisce l’azione in diversi ordini di causalità […]. Il brocardo nihil volitum quin 
praecognitum che intende riassumere in breve la correlazione mutua tra intelletto e volontà 
descritta dalla psicologia tomistica, non esclude […] la libertà della volontà […]. Intelletto, 
volontà, libero arbitrio sono dunque concetti che […] si intersecano nelle loro operazioni e si 
implicano a vicenda, come i nodi fondamentali di una concezione psicologica che intende 
salvaguardare le premesse filosofiche della antropologia cristiana43. 
Here are some principles we were able to collect during our readings 
on St. Thomas’ works. We believe that enumerating some of them will give 
light on the subject: 1. – “Will follows upon intellect”44; 2. – “The move-
41 Ibidem, I, q. 83, a. 3 in corp. 
42 coram Wynen, sent. diei 27 februarii 1937, RRDec., vol. XXIX, p. 171, n. 4. Also cfr. coram Heard, 
sent. diei 5 iunii 1941, RRDec., vol. XXXI, p. 490; coram Pinna, sent. diei 21 dicembris 1959, RRDec. 
vol. LI, p. 624, n. 2, coram Lefebvre, sent. diei 8 iulii 1967, RRDec., vol. LIX, p. 563. 
43 O. Fumagalli Carulli, Intelletto e volontà nel consenso matrimoniale in diritto canonico, Milano 
1981, pp.102–109, n.111. Also cfr. O. Fumagalli Carulli, Sull’incapacità del volere nel matrimonio canonico 
in “Giurisprudenza Italiana”, 1970, IV, col. 174–178.
44 Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 19, a.1, in corp.
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ment of the will follows the movement of the intellect”45; 3. – “Every act 
of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect”46; 4. – “The will moves the 
intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the 
perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good. But as to the 
determination of the act, by which the act derives from the object, the 
intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a spe-
cial aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that 
the same is not mover and moved in the same respect”47; 5. – “Will is like 
mind in one way and unlike it in another. As regards the exercise of its act 
it is unlike, since will moves mind to act but it is not itself moved by any 
other power than itself. As regards objects it is like, for just as will is com-
pelled by an altogether good object but not by objects that can appear bad 
in some respect, so too mind is compelled by necessary truths that can’t 
be regarded as false, but not by contingent ones that might be false”48.
Is the will, therefore, superior to the intellect? St. Thomas himself an-
swered this question. The superiority of one thing over another – he says 
– can be considered in two ways: absolutely (simpliciter) and relatively 
(secundum quid). The former is considered to be such absolutely which 
is considered such in itself; while the latter is considered such relatively 
which is considered such with regard to something else. The first conse-
quence therefore is, if the will and the intellect were considered as regards 
to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power inasmuch as the 
object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object 
of the will. As St. Thomas explains, the object of the intellect is the very 
idea of the appetible good, and this appetible good – the idea of which is in 
the intellect – is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more 
abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself and therefore the 
object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since 
the proper nature of power is in its order to its object, it follows that the 
intellect in itself absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. Moreover, 
another necessary logical consequence of this distinction is, relatively and 
by comparison with something else. 
45 Ibidem, Ia IIae, q. 10, a.1, sed contra.
46 Ibidem, q. 4, a.4, ad 2.
47 Ibidem, q. 9, a.1, ad 3 or Reply Obj. 3.
48 Quaestiones Disputate de Malo, 6 to 10.
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Viewed from this angle, we can say that the will is superior to the in-
tellect inasmuch as the object of the will occurs in something higher than 
that in which occurs the object of the intellect: 
Utrum voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus […]. Respondeo dicendum quod emi-
nentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, 
secundum quid. Consideratur autem aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum 
tale: secundum quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum. - Si ergo 
intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. 
Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est 
simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus 
est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est 
obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractus, tanto secundum 
se est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. 
Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et no-
bilior voluntate […]. Secundum quid autem, et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas 
invenitur interdum altior intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori 
re invenitur quam obiectum intellectus49. 
A commentary by Prof. Mondin, an expert in St. Thomas, can be very 
helpful here. He says: 
Da ciò che s’è detto emergono due verità: in quanto appetito la volontà è subordinata all’intel-
letto: è l’intelletto che propone alla volontà ciò cui che essa esercita il suo potere de scelta; 
per contro, in quanto liberissima e sovrana su tutte le facoltà dell’uomo, la volontà è superiore 
al intelletto […]. Più precisamente, dal punto di vista della causalità efficiente la volontà è su-
periore all’intelletto, in quanto essa comanda a tutte le facoltà dell’anima, incluso l’intelletto50. 
In fact, in his book entitled L’uomo: chi è? also poses the same commen-
tary51. The author arrives at the same conclusion of the Angelic Doctor 
citing commentary on the Sententiae, d. 35 , q. 1 , a. 4.
Finally, an actus humanus – which is not merely an actus hominis – re-
quires in the person certain conditions which must be presupposed if the 
act is to be attributed to an individual as its dominus. Thus, using the words 
of Aristotle St. Thomas affirms that human beings are “masters of their 
own actions”, i.e. able to act or not to act. However, this can only be so 
if they can freely choose as man is capable to freely choose his actions52. 
Also we read in the Summa: “Homo est dominus sui actus, quod habet 
49 Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 83, a. 3.
50 B. Mondin, Op. cit., p. 667.
51 cfr. B. Mondin, L’uomo: chi è? Elementi di Antropologia Filosofica, VIIª Edition. Milano, 1992, pp. 
123–153. 
52 cfr. Quaestiones Disputate de Malo, 6.
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deliberationem de suis actibus: ex hoc enim quod ratio deliberans se ha-
bet ad opposita, voluntas in utrumque potest”53. In other words, from St. 
Thomas’ superb exposition we can say that man’s nature differs from the 
rest of the living creature by the fact he is equipped with the power of self 
determination based on reflection and thus, is capable of executing an act based 
on free choice. This power called free will is that which makes him master 
of his own actions: “sui iuris”. Now, since a person is an intellectual being 
it is evident that only acts in which the intellect and the will are freely 
operative could be considered human. The object of the intellect being 
the truth (ratio) and of the will being the good to be desired (bonum appe-
tendum) it follows that the operation of merely the intellect – or of merely 
the will – is not sufficient, ergo not human. Faculties are distinct by reasons 
of their objects but, they are faculties of the person and in the person and 
are thereby integrated to operational-mutual unity. This is equally clear 
from the foregoing analysis which St. Thomas holds on these spiritual 
faculties’ operational unity. 
Internal freedom proceeds from the operational 
unity of the Intellect and the Will
First and foremost, we say that we believe this principle to be in agree-
ment with that of the Angelic Doctor among others because we too found 
the same conclusion in the work of one of the experts on St. Thomas. “The 
will is so to say the final authority in ourselves, without whose participa-
tion no experience has full personal value or the gravity appropriate to the 
experiences of the human person. The value of the person is closely bound 
up with freedom, and freedom is a property of the will. [But] a really free 
commitment of the will is possible only on the basis of truth. The experience 
of freedom goes hand in hand with the experience of truth; truth is directly 
connected with the sphere of cognition”54. Moreover, “it has already been 
said that freedom of the will is possible only if it rests on truth in cognition. 
For it is a man’s duty to choose the true good. It is, indeed, duty that most 
fully displays the freedom of the human will. The will «ought to” follow 
53 Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 6 art. 2 ad 2um.
54 K. Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, Ignatius Press, San Francisco 1993, pp. 115–117; also cfr. Person 
and act, Cracow 1969, Part II of which is called “The Transcendence of the Person in the Act”, p. 145.
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the true good, but this “ought to” implies that it “may” equally well not 
do so»55. Later as Roman Pontiff: «The hypothesis of real incapacity is to 
be considered only when an anomaly of a serious nature is present, which, 
however it may be defined, must substantially vitiate the capacity of the 
individual to understand and/or to will”56.
We have just seen that freedom57 or free will58 is an act rooted in man’s 
psychic faculties (whereby the universal truth as good is chosen)59. Internal 
freedom proceeds from the intellect (naturally inclined to judge what is true) 
and the will (naturally inclined to will, love and desire what is good seen 
as an end); just as conclusions derive from principles60. Thus, St. Thomas 
defines free will (liberum arbitrium) as: “Free will is defined as the faculty 
of will and reason”61 and in another place – using the classical text of Peter 
Lombard –, as: “Free will is a faculty of reason and will whereby the good 
is chosen, with the help of grace, or evil is chosen if grace is lacking”62. 
Therefore, we can say that the Angelic Doctor places freedom only after 
the intellect and will. Man’s internal freedom was placed at “the conjunc-
tion of the intellect, which judged, and the will, which willed, loved and 
desired. From them it received the light and strength that were united 
within choice”63. Moreover, another fundamental affirmation follows that 
55 Ibidem, p. 119.
56 John Paul II, February 5, 1987, in AAS, 79 (1987) pp. 1453–1459; English translation taken 
from L’Osservatore Romana, February 23, 1987, pp. 6–7.
57 Freedom is generally the term preferred by most authors of modern commentaries 
on St. Thomas to designate the mode of exercise of an act. Although the Angelic Doctor applied the 
latin counterpart of the english expression free will to designate the human faculty called the free 
will. Cfr. S. Pinckaers, S., O.P. Op. cit., p. 379.
58 St. Thomas in the Summa Theologiae explained this question with a different repertoire 
of concepts. In English it is natural to phrase the question of human freedom in the terms: “Do 
human beings have free will?”. But in St. Thomas’ Latin which corresponds exactly to the English 
free will, he speaks of the will (voluntas); i.e. the intellectual appetite which is the subject of quaestio 
83 of the Summa Theologiae. Moreover, he does not customarily speak of free will (libera voluntas) 
or of the freedom of the will (libertas voluntatis). The noun which goes with the Latin word for free 
is not will but decision (arbitrium). It is to the topic of free decision (liberum arbitrium), that quaes-
tio 83 of the Summa Theologiae is developed. cfr. A. Kenny, Aquinas on the Mind, London 1993, p. 75.
59 Cfr. II Sententiae, dist. 25, I, art. I, q. 2.
60 Cfr. Ibidem, dist. 24, art. I, q. 1 ad 3. 
61 Summa Theologiae Ia IIae, q. 1, a.1 in corp.
62 II Sententiae, dist. 25, I, art. I, q. 2.
63 S. Pinckaers, O.P. Op. cit., p. 381–382.
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choice is a free act of the will informed by the intellect64. As the classical 
distinction of the Angelic Doctor runs: 
The word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something 
belonging to the will (…). Hence, Gregory of Nyssa says that choice is neither desired only, 
nor counseled only, but a combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is com-
posed of soul and body, not just a body nor a mere soul, but both; so is it with choice65. 
And, in another work, he develops the same argument in an even cle-
arer way: 
Ci sono delle potenze che raccolgono in se stesse il potere (virtutes) di varie facoltà, tale 
è il caso del libero arbitrio, come risulta da quanto segue. L’elezione (scelta) che è l’atto 
proprio del libero arbitrio, comporta la disanima (discretionem) e il desiderio; infatti 
scegliere è dare la preferenza a una cosa rispetto a un’altra. Ora, queste due azioni non 
si possono compiere senza l’apporto delle facoltà della ragione e della volontà. È quindi 
evidente che il libero arbitrio raccoglie il potere della volontà e della ragione, e perciò 
si dice facoltà di entrambe66.
Therefore, human acts depend upon the harmonious ordering of the 
will and the intellect, which is the only manner of assuring internal free-
dom in every consenting act or in every choice a person makes. “The root 
of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but as cause it’s root is reason. 
For the will tends freely towards various objects, precisely because the 
reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define 
the free will as being a free judgement arising from reason, implying that reason 
is the root of liberty”67. Hence, examining St. Thomas’s teachings in relation 
to the canonical doctrine on internal freedom elaborated hitherto one may 
say that indeed there is always a twofold aspect in every person’s free act: 
the intellect and the will giving man the internal freedom to choose. The 
intensity of each execution will now vary depending on the degree of the 
gravity required in every human act. 
64 As has been noted before: It is the analysis of choice that enables us to establish, as early 
as the first part (q. 83, a 3), the nature of free will. Vide supra: S. Pinckaers, O.P. Op. cit., p. 380.
65 Summa Theologiae Ia IIae, q. 13, a.1.
66 This citation is taken from Prof. Mondin’s Dizionario Enciclopedico referring to St. Thomas’ 
commentary, that is, II Sent., d. 24, q. 1. Here Prof. Mondin concludes: “Pertanto, secondo l’Aquinate, 
il libero arbitrio non è esclusivamente atto della volontà come sostengono certi volontaristi antichi 
(Scoto, Occam) e moderni (Nietzsche e Sarte), perché in tal caso si avrebbe un arbitrio cieco, e in 
nessun modo un arbitrio veramente libero”. B. Mondin, Op. cit., p. 59. 
67 Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 17, art. 1 ad 2. 
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The following citations on St. Thomas’ affirmations will help clarify 
better his teaching: 
The proper act of free will is choice: for we say that we have a free will because we can 
take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consi-
der the nature of free will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur 
in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive 
power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one 
thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required 
that the appetite should accept the judgement of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi 2) 
leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive 
power: since he says that choice is either an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite. But 
(Ethic. iii, loc. cit.) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice 
as a desire proceeding from counsel. And the reason of this is because the proper object of cho-
ice is the means to an end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called 
useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice 
is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free will is an appetitive power68. 
In another place he adds: 
The word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something 
belonging to the will: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi. 2) that choice is either intellect 
influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect69.
Here, it is very interesting to note that St. Thomas’ analysis on free choice 
centered on the joining and interaction of intellect and will in free choice, 
of judgement and willing, all of which made up human action as matter 
and form or body and soul70.
Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis we can now consider the question: Can 
there be anything that may affect – render defective or even take away 
– man’s exercise of his free choice? 
Again we should start by saying that at the root of man’s free will is his 
unique ability to choose. Not infrequently, however, personal and/or so-
68 Ibidem, I, q. 83, art. 3 in corp.
69 Ibidem, Ia IIae, q. 13, art. 1 sed contra. 
70 Cfr. S. Pinckaers, Op. cit., p. 380. Also see his same study on choice in the analysis of the human 
act, in vol. I in Les Actes humains de la Somme des Jeunes (Paris, 1962), particularly notes 52 and 88, 
as well as Les Reseignements techniques , 422–434. Here he says that the distinction between the order 
of specification and the order of exercise formed the principal support for the argumentation in the 
famous disputed question De malo, q. 6, occasioned by discussions on free will.
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cial conditions71 sometimes obscure in varying degrees the free exercise 
of the faculty of the will. Therefore, we can say that there is a so-called 
limits to the exercise of man’s free will.
Human freedom is not without bounds72. As St. Thomas’ explains, natural 
tendencies are according to a form, i.e. that corresponding objects stem 
from a natural inherent form. The will, a rational appetite or desire, is no 
other than a natural tendency stemming in a similar way from a form that 
is thought of. This natural inherent form of the will – that is thought of – is 
the necessary universal good. Thus, St. Thomas affirms: “Voluntas nihil 
facit nisi secundum quod est mota per suum obiectum quod est bonum 
appetibile”73.
Now, in the Summa theologiae St. Thomas adroitly presents how man’s 
will is more or less dependent on the contribution of the intellect. After 
having seen that the sensitive appetites may have their influence into 
the area of the intellect and that these internal motivations work upon 
the will’s ability to choose – i.e. the capacity of man to determine himself 
in favor of one-alternative in preference from another – the possibility 
therefore exists that they may determine the act of the will: 
The passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its 
object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a pas-
sion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not 
for the passion.74 
Also in his work De malo St. Thomas affirms that all our knowledge comes 
through the sense but, that doesn’t mean that everything we know is sensed 
or known through some immediate sensed effect: mind itself is known 
to itself through its activity and that can’t be sensed. In the same way will’s 
interior activity is known to mind, as something put in movement by mind’s act, 
and, in another way, as something causing mind to act, as we have said: as ef-
fects are known through causes and causes through effects75. 
71 Cfr. John Paul II, Apost. Ex. Familiaris consortio, November 22, 1981, n. 82 in AAS, 74 (1982), p. 183. 
72 Cfr. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1. Its corresponding text is found in his work Quaestiones 
Disputate de Malo, q. 6.
73 De Veritate, q. 14, a. 2. 
74 Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 10. Art. 3. 
75 Cfr. Quaestiones Disputate de Malo, 6.
However, not as long as man remains sane to control himself and refuse 
to be blindly influenced by them: 
Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly 
bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent 
access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some 
other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the 
body. Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the 
judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the 
will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not 
subject to the passion, the will’s movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity 
to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the 
will in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the 
will, it does not necessarily follow the passion […]. And, since there is in man a twofold 
nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect 
of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as in 
the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But 
sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains 
free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold him-
self in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man 
is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him 
otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion76.
After all that has been said, St. Thomas gives us a further clarification. 
Now, it would seem erroneous to insist that the will is moved of neces-
sity by the exterior mover, which is God77. On the contrary, the Angelic 
Doctor writes that ordinarily God does not move the will to act of neces-
sity in particular choices. Rather, God moves all things that move, i.e. God 
moves them to act according to the nature that He gave them. Therefore, 
God moves contingent things to act contingently: “God moves man’s free 
will to act freely”78.
76 Summa Theologiae, Ia IIae, q. 10. Art. 3.
77 Ibidem, Art. 4: «Utrum voluntas moveatur de necessitate ab exteriori motivo quod est Deus».
78 In De malo St. Thomas affirms that God moves wills—though infallibly because his mov-
ing power can’t fail—freely and without compulsion, in accordance with the nature of what 
he is moving, which is open to more than one possibility. Just as his providence works infallibly 
in everything, yet in such a way that effects follow contingently from contingent causes; for God 
moves everything proportionately, each in its own way. Cfr. Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, q. 6 and 
IV Sententiae dist. 36, q. 1, ad 1–2. 
